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Abstract
& Lesion, functional imaging, and single-unit studies in
human and nonhuman animals have demonstrated a role for
the amygdala in processing stimuli with emotional and social
significance. We investigated the recognition of a wide variety
of facial expressions, including basic emotions (e.g., happiness,
anger) and social emotions (e.g., guilt, admiration, flirtatious-
ness). Prior findings with a standardized set of stimuli indicated
that recognition of social emotions can be signaled by the eye
region of the face and is disproportionately impaired in autism
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997). To test the
hypothesis that the recognition of social emotions depends on
the amygdala, we administered the same stimuli to 30 subjects
with unilateral amygdala damage (16 left, 14 right), 2 with
bilateral amygdala damage, 47 brain-damaged controls, and 19
normal controls. Compared with controls, subjects with
unilateral or bilateral amygdala damage were impaired when
recognizing social emotions; moreover, they were more
impaired in recognition of social emotions than in recognition
of basic emotions, and, like previously described patients with
autism, they were impaired also when asked to recognize
social emotions from the eye region of the face alone. The
findings suggest that the human amygdala is relatively
specialized to process stimuli with complex social significance.
The results also provide further support for the idea that some
of the impairments in social cognition seen in patients with
autism may result from dysfunction of the amygdala. &
INTRODUCTION
The amygdala plays an important role in processing
social information from the face, as borne out by a
large number of studies in both monkeys and humans
(Adolphs, 2002). Most studies of the human amygdala’s
role in face recognition have focused on recognition of
so-called basic emotional expressions: happiness, sur-
prise, fear, anger, disgust, and sadness, which can be
reliably signaled by the face and for which there exist
extensively normed and commonly used sets of stimuli
(Ekman & Friesen, 1976). The human amygdala is
activated when subjects perceive certain basic facial
emotions (Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 1999;
Phillips et al., 1998; Breiter et al., 1996; Morris et al.,
1996), and amygdala damage impairs recognition of
basic emotions (Anderson, Spencer, Fulbright, & Phelps,
2000; Broks et al., 1998; Calder et al., 1996; Young,
Hellawell, Van de Wal, & Johnson, 1996; Adolphs,
Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; Adolphs et al.,
1999). However, the amygdala’s role appears to extend
to more complex social judgments as well: Subjects
with bilateral amygdala damage are impaired in judging
the trustworthiness or approachability of other people
from their faces (Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 1998),
and amygdala activation in normal subjects correlates
with untrustworthiness judgments (Winston, Strange,
O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2002), as well as other social
judgments such as aspects of racial stereotyping (Hart
et al., 2000; Phelps et al., 2000).
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, and Jolliffe (1997) ex-
plored the recognition of complex mental and emo-
tional states, including social emotions, from the face.
Their findings were threefold: (1) Such complex mental
states are recognized disproportionately by information
from the region of the eyes in the face (Baron-Cohen
et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, &
Plumb, 2001). (2) When making judgments about such
states from images of the eye region of the face, normal
subjects activated the amygdala in functional imaging
studies (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). (3) This amygdala
activation was not found in subjects diagnosed with
autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999), who are impaired
in their ability to recognize complex mental states from
the eyes. These findings, together with many others,
have suggested that the severe impairments in everyday
social behavior exhibited by people with autism may be
attributable in part to dysfunction in circuits including
the amygdala (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000).
We set out to test the hypothesis that the amygdala is
necessary to recognize social emotions from the face.
The hypothesis predicts that damage to the amygdala
will impair performance on tasks that assess the ability
to recognize facial expressions showing social emotions.1University of Iowa, 2Cambridge University
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We carried out additional analyses to investigate
whether amygdala damage might lead to an impairment
that was disproportionately severe for the recognition of
social emotions as compared with the recognition of
basic emotions. Using the stimuli developed by Baron-
Cohen et al. (1997, 2001), we studied groups of subjects
with unilateral amygdala damage (n = 16 left and 14
right), and two rare patients with complete bilateral
amygdala damage (Figure 1). Subjects were shown
pictures of the face stimuli and asked to match them
to a list of words for emotions. Our initial analysis used a
2  2  2 factorial design: the type of emotion shown in
the face stimulus (basic or social), the type of emotion
described in the list of words, and the subject group
(amygdala lesion or brain-damaged control). This design
permitted us to examine independently the effect of
emotion type shown in the face stimulus and the effect
of emotion type that subjects were asked to match on
the word labels, as well as their interaction.
The stimuli used by Baron-Cohen et al. (1997, 2001)
consisted of faces expressing a variety of emotional and
more complex mental states. We initially used the same
categories used by Baron-Cohen et al.: (1) faces show-
ing basic emotions (happiness, sadness, etc.), (2) faces
showing complex states other than basic emotions
(including states such as thoughtfulness, boredom,
arrogance, flirtatiousness). An analysis using these
classes of stimuli permits comparisons with prior stud-
ies that have used the same stimuli in people with
autism. However, we were interested in further sub-
dividing category 2 into those states that are social
emotions, and thus undertook additional analyses using
a subset of category 2 (including flirtatiousness and
arrogance, but excluding states like thoughtfulness and
boredom). A final issue of interest was whether the
possible impairments found relied on configural pro-
cessing of the whole face or whether they might be
attributable to the abnormal processing of information
Figure 1. Neuroanatomy of brain-damaged subjects. Images were rendered using BRAINVOX and encode lesion density by color (see scale).
(a) Lesions of brain-damaged control subjects. (b) Lesions of subjects with unilateral amygdala damage. (c) Lesions of two subjects with bilateral
amygdala damage: S. M. (top) and R. H. (bottom).
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from only a restricted region of the face. Following
Baron-Cohen et al., we repeated our experiment twice:
with whole faces and with only the eye region of the
face (cf. Figure 2 for an example of the stimuli used).
RESULTS
Background Neuroanatomy and Neuropsychology
The neuroanatomical distribution of lesions of brain-
damaged subjects is shown in Figure 1, demonstrating
that lesions were restricted to anteromedial temporal lobe
including the amygdala in the case of temporal lobecto-
mies, and excluded the amygdala in the case of brain-
damaged controls. S. M. had bilateral damage restricted
to the amygdala, whereas R. H. had bilateral amygdala
damage as well as extensive damage to temporal cortex.
The neuropsychological background data (Table 1)
showed that none of the subject groups and no individ-
ual subject within a group had visuoperceptual impair-
ments. All subjects performed in the normal range on the
Benton Faces task, a sensitive measure of visuopercep-
tual ability in processing faces. Subjects with unilateral
amygdala damage were significantly younger (t = 5.7,
p < .0001), but did not differ on performance IQ (t =
0.3, ns) or verbal IQ (t =0.9, ns) from brain-damaged
Figure 2. Examples of stimuli
showing the whole face (a) and
the eye region (b). Subjects
were asked questions about
both basic emotions (‘‘Is it
happy, sad, etc.?’’) and social
emotions (‘‘Is it flirtatious,
guilty, etc.’’). Note that there
are appropriate answers in both
cases: In this example, the face
can be described as happy and
also as flirtatious, depending on
the list of choices available.
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controls. Gender ratios, education, aphasia, and depres-
sion were similar across groups. We calculated the
ANOVAs reported below also with a subset of brain-
damaged controls of similar mean age to the subjects
with unilateral amygdala damage to ensure that age
differences could not account for the patterns of per-
formance we observed: There were no differences in the
direction or magnitude of the findings, and only a loss of
statistical power due to smaller samples when such
analyses were carried out, confirming that age differ-
ences do not account for the findings we report below.
Recognition of Basic Emotions and Complex
Mental States from the Whole Face
We first undertook analyses that corresponded to those
in prior studies, namely, of the categories of basic
emotions and complex mental states. As noted, the
design of the study allowed us to examine the effects
of the emotion shown in the face and the emotion
given in the label independently. As Figure 3 shows, all
subject groups gave lower performances when asked to
match faces to labels that stood for complex mental
states than to labels that stood for basic emotions;
likewise, subjects gave somewhat lower performances
when matching faces expressing complex mental states
than when matching faces expressing basic emotions.
Brain-damaged controls performed identically to nor-
mal controls when recognizing basic emotions (83%
correct when matching faces showing basic emotions
with a list of the labels for the basic emotions; upper
left in Figure 3), but had a lower mean accuracy score
when recognizing complex mental states (58% correct
when matching faces showing complex mental states
Table 1. Background Demographic and Neuropsychological Data for the Brain-Damaged Subjects (Means and SD)
Sex Age Education VIQ PIQ Benton Aphasia Depression
L 7 F/9 M 38 ± 9 14 ± 2 101 ± 15 107 ± 13 44 ± 3 0 0.5 ± 0.6
R 7 F/7 M 34 ± 10 13 ± 2 94 ± 11 97 ± 16 43 ± 4 0 0.7 ± 0.9
BDC 25 F/22 M 52 ± 14 14 ± 3 101 ± 20 103 ± 14 45 ± 4 0.3 ± 0.6 0.2 ± 0.5
S. M. F 32 12 86 95 42 0 0
R. H. M 44 16 110 116 45 0 0
Subject groups are abbreviated as follows: L: left amygdala damage; R: right amygdala damage; BDC: brain-damaged controls; S. M. and R. H. are the
two subjects with bilateral amygdala damage; VIQ/PIQ: verbal and performance IQ calculated from the WAIS-R or WAIS-III; Benton: score on the
Benton Facial Recognition Task (in the normal range for all subjects); Aphasia/depression: composite scores for language impairment and residual
depression. See Methods for details.
Figure 3. Mean performances
in judging the whole face. The
two columns show perfor-
mances on two different sub-
sets of the stimuli: those faces
expressing only basic emotions
and those faces expressing
complex mental states. The two
rows show performances
according to the labeling that
was required of subjects: Either
assign a label to the face from a
list of the basic emotions (top
tow) or from a list of labels for
complex mental states ( bottom
row). Bars indicate means and
SEM, from left to right, for
normal controls (NC),
brain-damaged controls (BDC),
subjects with left (L) or right
(R) unilateral amygdala damage
(AMY), and the two subjects
with bilateral amygdala damage
(S. M. and R. H.).
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with a list of the labels for these; lower right in Figure
3). Subjects with unilateral amygdala damage per-
formed comparably to brain-damaged controls when
recognizing basic emotions, whereas one of the sub-
jects with bilateral amygdala damage (S. M.) had lower
scores. When recognizing complex mental states, sub-
jects with unilateral amygdala damage gave lower per-
formance scores than brain-damaged controls, as did
subjects with bilateral amygdala damage.
The above findings were examined in a 2  2  2
repeated measures ANOVA with factors of type of
expression shown in the face (basic emotion or com-
plex mental state), category of the label (basic emotion
or complex mental state), and subject group (brain-
damaged control vs. unilateral amygdala damage). Each
subject thus had four scores in this analysis (corre-
sponding to the four quadrants of Figure 3); subjects
with bilateral amygdala damage were omitted. We found
the following results: Across all subjects, performances
on the faces showing complex mental states, or on the
labels for complex mental states, were worse than on
the basic emotion faces or on the basic emotion labels
( ps < .0001 for both faces and labels). Subject groups
differed overall in that subjects with amygdala damage
performed worse than brain-damaged controls ( p <
.005). Most interesting were significant interactions of
subject group and label ( p < .01) and subject group
and face factors ( p < .05). Post hoc Scheffe corrected
t tests showed that in both cases the difference between
controls and amygdala subjects was not significant
when comparing performances involving basic emotions
( ps > .2), but was highly significant when involving
complex mental states ( ps < .0001). Although the
Group  Face  Label three-way interaction was not
itself significant, an examination of the pairwise compar-
isons of this interaction corroborated the above find-
ings: Subjects with amygdala damage did not differ from
controls when matching faces that expressed basic
emotions to labels denoting basic emotions ( p > .7),
but were significantly worse than controls when match-
ing faces that expressed complex mental states to labels
denoting complex mental states ( p < .0001).
Recognition of Basic Emotions and Complex
Mental States from the Eyes
In general, it is more difficult to recognize emotions
from only a small region of the face, such as the eyes,
than from the whole face. In our analysis, we controlled
for this effect since correctness scores were calculated
on the basis of the distribution of performances given by
normal subjects to the stimuli. Figure 4 summarizes
these data, in the same format previously shown for
Figure 3.
Some general trends are evident in Figure 4. First,
brain-damaged subjects in general perform somewhat
worse than normal controls, as might be expected. In
particular, brain-damaged subjects perform dispropor-
tionately worse when matching to labels for complex
mental states, as we saw in the case of whole faces
Figure 4. Mean performances
in judging the eyes only. Format
and abbreviations are as in
Figure 3.
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(Figure 3). Of special interest, given the prior findings
by Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) that recognition of com-
plex mental states requires information about the eye
region of the face, was a statistical comparison that
included an examination of the whole face as compared
to the eyes. We thus analyzed the data from both the
eyes and the whole face with a 2  2  2  2 repeated
measures full-interaction ANOVA with factors of type of
visual stimulus (whole face or eyes), emotion type
expressed by the visual stimulus (basic emotion or
complex mental state), emotion type given in the label
(basic emotion or complex mental state), and subject
group (brain-damaged control, unilateral amygdala
damage). Again, subjects with bilateral amygdala dam-
age were not included in the analysis. All factors
showed significance at the p < .01 level (group F =
7.3, label emotion F = 204, expression emotion F = 75,
face/eye F = 34). In particular, amygdala subjects
performed worse than did controls, recognition scores
for complex mental states were lower than for basic
emotions, and recognition scores from the eyes alone
were lower than recognition scores from the whole
face. Furthermore, there were significant interactions
of group with the label factor (F = 4.3, p < .05), with
the facial expression factor (F = 4.7, p < .05), and with
the eye/face factor (F = 4.5, p < .05).
Post hoc tests revealed some further patterns. From
the Group  Label interaction, subjects with unilateral
amygdala damage performed worse than brain-damaged
controls only when matching the visual stimuli to labels
for complex mental states ( p < .0001), but not when
matching them to labels for basic emotions ( p > .05);
likewise, from the Group  Facial expression interac-
tion, subjects with amygdala damage performed worse
than brain-damaged controls only when matching to
visual stimuli expressing complex mental states ( p <
.0001), but not when matching to those expressing basic
emotions ( p > .1, post hoc Scheffe corrected t tests in
all cases). In regard to recognition from the eyes com-
pared with the whole face, subjects with unilateral
amygdala damage performed worse than brain-damaged
controls only when processing whole faces ( p < .0001),
but not when recognizing the eyes alone ( p > .05), a
pattern that likely resulted from the fact that the means
and variances in control performance were considerably
worse for the eyes alone than for the whole face,
compromising statistical power in detecting any signifi-
cant differences between groups.
Although higher order interactions were not them-
selves significant, corrected pairwise contrasts from
them corroborated the above patterns. The three-way
interaction of Group  Label  Facial expression
showed that amygdala subjects performed worse than
brain-damaged controls when matching expressions of
complex mental states to labels that stood for complex
mental states ( p < .0001), when matching expressions
of complex mental states to labels that stood for basic
emotions ( p < .01) or when matching expressions of
basic emotions to labels that stood for complex mental
states ( p < .05), but not when matching expressions of
basic emotions with labels denoting the basic emotions
( p > .9). Especially noteworthy is thus the consistently
impaired performance of subjects with unilateral amyg-
dala damage, when asked to utilize information pertain-
ing to complex mental states, either from the visual
stimulus or from the label.
Is the Amygdala Specialized for Recognizing
Social Emotions?
The above analyses partitioned the stimuli into the two
broad classes originally given by Baron-Cohen et al.
(1997, 1999): basic emotions and complex mental
states. However, as described in the Methods, it seems
reasonable to subdivide the second category into states
that would not normally be considered emotions
(namely, interested, scheming, thoughtful, quizzical,
bored) and those that would normally be considered
social emotions, states that are emotions but that only
make sense in an explicitly social relation (namely,
arrogant, guilty, admiring, and flirtatious). Specifically,
we investigated the hypothesis that amygdala damage
might not impair the recognition of all complex mental
states, but perhaps disproportionately impair recogni-
tion of social emotions.
For this analysis, full face and eyes alone stimuli were
broken down into the two groups expressing basic
emotions and expressing social emotions. Although all
subject groups had lower mean scores on social as
compared to basic emotions, subjects with unilateral
amygdala damage performed close to brain-damaged
controls on basic emotions, but were impaired when
matching faces that express social emotions. We ana-
lyzed the data as before, with a 2  2  2  2 repeated-
measures ANOVA with factors of visual stimulus type
(whole or eyes), emotion expressed in the visual stim-
ulus (basic or social), emotion type provided in the label
(basic or social), and subject group (brain-damaged
control or unilateral amygdala damage). All factors
showed significance at the p < .005 level (group:
F = 10, label emotion: F = 205, visual stimulus emotion:
F = 26, face/eye: F = 50). There was a significant
Group  Label interaction (F = 11.1, p < .001) but no
other significant interactions.
The significance of the interaction term led us to carry
out post hoc corrected t tests that were especially in-
formative. When examining the Group  Label interac-
tion, there was no difference between controls and
amygdala subjects when matching to labels for basic
emotions ( p > .3), but amygdala subjects were signifi-
cantly worse than controls when matching to labels for
social emotions ( p < .0001, Scheffe tests). Although none
of the other interactions with group were significant, we
examined pairwise contrasts with corrected t tests. For
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the interaction of group with the emotion expressed, we
found that amygdala subjects were significantly worse
than controls when matching expressions showing social
emotions ( p < .0001), but not when matching expres-
sions of basic emotions ( p > .1). The three-way inter-
action of Group  Label emotion  Expression emotion
summarizes these effects best: Amygdala subjects per-
formed worse than controls only in one out of the four
meaningful comparisons: when matching visual stimuli
expressing social emotions to labels that stood for social
emotions ( p < .0001, all other ps > .2). Moreover, this
difference held up equally in regard to just the eyes
( p < .0001) or the whole face ( p < .001, obtained from
the four-way interaction among all factors).
As a final analysis, we compared, within each subject,
how well the subject scored when matching expressions
to labels for the basic or for the social emotions. Table 2
shows a summary of these difference scores for all the
subject groups, for the eyes, and whole face, broken
down this time with respect to expressions of basic
emotions, expressions of social emotions (the four
noted above), and expressions that were neither basic
nor social emotions (i.e., the complex mental states
minus the social emotions). Subjects with amygdala
damage in general performed comparably or better than
brain-damaged controls in regard to expressions of basic
emotions, but showed impairments in regard to expres-
sions of social emotions. Especially striking are the
performances on the eye stimuli showing social emo-
tions, for which subjects with either left or right unilat-
eral amygdala damage, as well as both S. M. and R. H.,
were worse than brain-damaged controls in matching
such stimuli to labels for the social emotions, than to
labels for the basic emotions. This pattern was not seen
for the third category of expressions (the complex
mental states minus the social emotions). In fact, for
this latter class of stimuli, subjects with amygdala dam-
age tended to perform better than brain-damaged con-
trols. This result argues that the previous impairment we
found in subjects with amygdala damage in recognizing
complex mental states resulted not from a general
impairment in recognizing all complex mental states,
but rather from a more specific impairment in recogniz-
ing social emotions. To corroborate this impression, we
carried out a 2  2  3 ANOVA with factors of subject
group (brain-damaged control or unilateral amygdala
damage), emotion type given in the label (basic or
complex mental state), and emotion type expressed by
the eyes (basic emotion, social emotion, or complex
mental states other than the social emotions). We
specifically examined the interaction of Group  Emo-
tion expressed by the eyes. Although this interaction
term was not itself significant (F = 2.0, p = .1), exami-
nation of its pairwise contrasts was very informative.
Subjects with amygdala damage did not differ from
brain-damaged controls when processing eyes that ex-
pressed basic emotions ( p > .9) or when processing
eyes that expressed complex mental states that were not
social emotions ( p > .2), but were significantly worse
than brain-damaged controls when processing eyes that
expressed social emotions ( p < .05, Scheffe corrected
t tests). It is thus only when processing information
regarding social emotions, not when processing basic
emotions or complex mental states that are not social
emotions, that amygdala damage impairs recognition of
facial expressions. Moreover, this specific pattern of
Table 2. Performance Differences (Means Shown) When Matching Visual Stimuli to Labels for Basic Emotions or to Labels for
Complex Mental States
Expression Category
Controls Amygdala
S. M. R. H.Normal Brain-Damaged Left Right
Eyes
Basic 0.02 0.12 0.13 0.2 0.03 0.08
Social 0.11 0.12 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.29
Other 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.13 0.1 0.22
All 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.06 0.2
Face
Basic 0.13 0.19 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.09
Social 0.10 0.18 0.29 0.25 0.51 0.56
Other 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.12 0.00
All 0.09 0.14 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.16
The visual stimuli (eyes or whole face) are broken down according to their expression of basic emotion, social emotion, and other (nonbasic and
nonsocial). The last row (all) gives the mean difference score for all stimuli. Positive numbers indicate that subjects performed better when
matching the stimuli to labels for basic emotions than to labels for complex mental states.
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impairment is evident when subjects perceive only the
eye region of the face.
DISCUSSION
All subjects in this study were neuroanatomically and
neuropsychologically very well characterized, permitting
us to exclude several confounds, such as systematic
differences in neuropsychological background abilities.
Specifically, differences in age, IQ, and visuoperceptual
abilities cannot explain the findings. Nor were the le-
sions of subjects with amygdala damage simply more
extensive than those who did not have amygdala damage
(an exception to this is subject R. H. who had bilateral
amygdala damage as well as extensive damage to other
temporal lobe structures). The statistically significant
effects we report therefore should be robust indicators
of real differences due to the site of lesion between
subject groups and should permit inferences regarding
the role of the amygdala in processing our stimuli.
We used an established set of stimuli (Baron-Cohen
et al., 1997, 2001) to investigate the recognition of basic
emotions, complex mental states, and social emotions
from whole faces and eyes. The analyses showed statisti-
cally significant patterns of impairment in subjects with
damage to the amygdala compared with brain-damaged
controls who did not have amygdala damage. The main
conclusions can be summarized as follows.
1. Amygdala damage impairs recognition of complex
mental states more than it impairs recognition of basic
emotions, on average. This impairment was evident
either when matching to faces expressing complex men-
tal states or when matching to labels denoting complex
mental states (Figure 3). There were statistically highly
significant differences demonstrating impaired recogni-
tion of complex mental states from faces in subjects with
unilateral amygdala damage.
2. The above impairment in recognizing complex
mental states was evident both when subjects were
shown whole faces and when they were shown only
the eye region of the face. Thus, recognition of complex
mental states from the eye region of the face is dispro-
portionately impaired in subjects with amygdala damage
(Figure 4), a pattern of impairment that parallels impair-
ments reported in subjects with autism (Baron-Cohen
et al., 1997, 1999).
3. A further analysis showed that amygdala damage
impairs recognition of social emotions (guilt, arrogance,
admiration, and flirtatiousness), again both from the
whole face and from the eyes. Subjects with amygdala
damage showed a relative impairment in matching to
labels of the social emotions compared with labels of the
basic emotions that was striking only for faces or eyes
expressing social emotions, but not for expressions of
basic emotions or complex mental states other than the
social emotions (interest, boredom, thoughtfulness,
scheming, and quizzical) (Table 2).
The above set of findings supports our initial hypoth-
esis that the amygdala is important to recognize social
emotions from faces. Furthermore, they indicate that
the impairment in recognition of social emotions we
found is due not to a broader impairment in recognizing
all complex mental states, but rather to a specific impair-
ment in recognizing those complex mental states that
are social emotions. We found this pattern of impair-
ment both in subjects with unilateral and with bilateral
amygdala damage. Our findings are in line with several
studies reviewed in the Introduction, which implicate
the amygdala in processing complex social stimuli and in
regulating social behaviors, and we therefore suggest
that the human amygdala may be relatively specialized
to process explicitly social emotions rather than other
information from facial expression.
A final issue of interest concerns the implications of
our findings for a neurobiological understanding of
autism. Arguably, the evidence for dysfunction in a
particular structure as a contributor to autism is strong-
est in the case of the amygdala: Morphological, neuro-
transmitter-related, and functional imaging studies all
support the so-called amygdala theory of autism (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2000). An additional approach, which we
took in a prior study, compares performances between
people with autism and neurological subjects with gross
lesions of the amygdala (Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 2001).
Although such concordant findings cannot unequivo-
cally demonstrate a link between the amygdala and
autism, they do suggest that such a link is likely to be
at least part of the story, especially if the pattern of
impairments that are shared is quite specific. The find-
ings from the present study can be compared with those
from Baron-Cohen et al. in people with autism. Like
autistic people, subjects with amygdala damage showed
impaired recognition of social emotions from the eye
region of the face, a task that also activates the amygdala
in normal individuals. Taken together, the results pro-
vide further support for the idea that amygdala dysfunc-
tion contributes to impaired social cognition in subjects
with autism.
METHODS
Subjects
Subjects with both unilateral and bilateral amygdala
damage participated in our study. A total of 30 post-
operative subjects who had undergone unilateral tem-
poral lobectomy for the treatment of epilepsy (16 left,
14 right) participated; all of these had single, focal,
stable (nonprogressive) neurosurgical lesions confined
to the anterior temporal lobe on one side, including
part of the amygdala and all of temporal pole (Figure
1b). Although some of these subjects were taking anti-
epileptic medications, post hoc investigations showed
that there was no systematic association between either
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dosage or type of medication and task performances in
our experiments.
We also tested two subjects who had complete bilat-
eral amygdala damage (Figure 1c): S. M. and R. H. S. M.
is a 34-year-old woman with Urbach–Wiethe disease,
which resulted in destruction of the entire amygdala as
well as minor damage to anterior entorhinal cortex
(Adolphs & Tranel, 2000; Tranel & Hyman, 1990). R. H.
suffered from herpes simplex encephalitis, which re-
sulted in complete bilateral destruction of all medial
temporal lobe structures, encompassing both amygda-
lae, as well as regions of temporal neocortex (Tranel,
Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Adolphs et al., 1998).
Performances from subjects with amygdala damage
were compared with those from 47 brain-damaged
control subjects who had lesions distributed through-
out various brain regions, but not in the amygdala
(Figure 1a). Demographic and background neuropsy-
chological information for all subjects is given in Table 1.
All brain-damaged subjects were selected from the
Patient Registry of the Division of Cognitive Neuro-
science, and had been fully characterized neuropsycho-
logically and neuroanatomically (Tranel, 1996; Damasio
& Frank, 1992). All data presented here were collected
during the chronic epoch from brain-damaged partic-
ipants, after the individuals had achieved a stable
cognitive profile (>4 months post lesion acquisition).
Normative data were obtained from a group of 19
normal controls with no history of neurological or
psychiatric disease. All subjects had given informed con-
sent to participate in these studies as approved by the
Human Subjects Committee of the University of Iowa.
Background and Control Tasks
For all brain-damaged subjects, we collected background
neuropsychological data regarding IQ, basic visual per-
ception, speech and language, and depression (Table 1).
Specifically, data were derived from the following tasks.
Verbal and Performance IQ
These measures were obtained from the WAIS-R or
WAIS-III for all subjects.
The Benton Facial Recognition Task
This task requires subjects to match the faces of identical
individuals taken under different views and lighting
conditions and provides a sensitive measure of basic
visuoperceptual function (Benton, Hamsher, Varney, &
Spreen, 1983).
Speech and Language Functioning
Speech and language were assessed with the Multi-
lingual Aphasia Examination (Benton & Hamsher, 1989)
and the Boston Diagnostic Aphasia Examination (Good-
glass & Kaplan, 1983). On the basis of data from these
two instruments and on observations recorded in the
neuropsychological reports, a neuropsychologist blind
to the hypotheses of the current study rated each
subject on a scale from 0 (‘‘normal’’) to 3 (‘‘severe
impairment’’) in terms of speech and language func-
tioning. These scores thus represent summary meas-
ures of the overall degree of speech/language
impairment in each subject.
Depression
Depression was assessed by the Beck Depression In-
ventory (Beck, 1987), the MMPI, and MMPI-2 as well as
interviews with the subject and relatives, on the basis of
which a neuropsychologist blind to the hypotheses of
the current study rated each subject on a scale from 0
(‘‘normal’’) to 3 (‘‘severely depressed’’).
Experimental Tasks
We used a set of stimuli that has been used previously
with brain-damaged and normal populations (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997, 1999, 2001). Stimuli were photo-
graphs of the same woman showing various facial
expressions. There were 20 different facial expressions.
As described in the prior studies (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1997, 1999, 2001), two different versions of these photo-
graphs were generated: (1) the section of the photo-
graph showing the eyes and surrounding region only
and (2) whole face. Examples of stimuli are given in
Figure 2.
Baron-Cohen et al. (1997, 1999, 2001) had identified
two categories of facial expression in their original
studies: basic emotions and complex mental states.
We consequently carried out two tasks in which subjects
were asked to recognize these two categories. We thus
showed subjects four blocks corresponding to the two
types of stimuli and the two types of task: In blocks 1
and 2, subjects were shown 20 pictures of the eyes and
were asked to match each picture to a list of basic
emotions in one block (the labels listed under number
1 below) and to a list of complex mental states in
the other block (the labels listed under number 2
below). In blocks 3 and 4, subjects were shown 20
pictures of the entire face under the two different task
conditions. Blocks 1 and 2 were always shown prior to
blocks 3 and 4 to avoid the possibility that the experi-
ence with the full face could prime judgment of the
eyes seen alone.
For the purpose of data analysis, we divided the
stimuli into three categories, two of them identical to
the categories specified by Baron-Cohen et al. and used
in the tasks above (basic emotions and complex mental
states) and a third derived from one of the other
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categories in order to provide a specific exploration of
social emotions:
1. Basic emotions: There were 10 photographs show-
ing basic emotions, as originally defined by Baron-Cohen
et al. (1997): two each of happiness, anger, and surprise,
and one each of fear, disgust, sadness, and distress. The
rationale for this category was that the stimuli corre-
sponded to the basic emotions found in other studies;
with the possible exception of ‘‘distress,’’ they in fact
correspond exactly to those six basic emotions shown by
Ekman to be recognized cross-culturally from the face
(Ekman, 1992, 1994) and proposed to rely on innately
specified mechanisms (Ekman, 1973).
2. Complex mental states: There were 10 photographs
corresponding to what Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) had
termed ‘‘complex mental states’’: two photographs of
interested and one each of scheming, thoughtful, quiz-
zical, bored, arrogant, guilty, admiring, and flirting. The
rationale for this category was twofold: First, they were
specified by exclusion—they were not basic emotions.
Second, these were precisely those expressions shown
previously to depend most critically on information
signaled by the eye region of the face, and shown to
be recognized abnormally by subjects with autism, sug-
gesting that they draw on neural processes partly dis-
tinct from those used to process basic emotions.
3. Social emotions: There were four photographs
showing social emotions, which were a subset of the
stimuli in category 2: arrogant, guilty, admiring, and
flirting. This was not a category previously used by
Baron-Cohen et al. (1997), but one that we explicitly
wanted to explore in the present study. The rationale for
this category was that we wanted a set of emotions that
depended on complex social context for their specifica-
tion. Thus, basic emotions, such as fear, disgust, and so
forth, while they certainly figure in social communica-
tion, can also arise outside of any social context (e.g.,
when falling off a cliff or smelling rotten eggs). By
contrast, it is impossible to understand social emotions
outside of a social context: They only arise in our
interactions with other people.
All data were scored in relation to the relative fre-
quencies of occurrence of responses given by normal
control subjects. A subject always obtained a score of
1.0 on whatever label received the highest proportion
of responses in the normal control group. Thus, if 100%
of normal subjects called a happy face ‘‘happy,’’ a
subject would get a score of 1.0 for choosing the label
‘‘happy’’ and 0.0 for all other choices. On the other
hand, if 50% of normal subjects called a surprised face
‘‘surprise,’’ 40% called it ‘‘afraid,’’ and 10% called it
‘‘sad,’’ a subject would receive a score for that face of
1.0 if choosing the label ‘‘surprise,’’ 0.8 if choosing the
label ‘‘afraid,’’ and 0.2 if choosing the label ‘‘sad.’’ In
this way, correctness was made a parametric function
solely of the distribution of responses that normal
subjects gave to the face: High scores correspond to
relatively better performance, low scores to relatively
worse performance.
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